Why not start with red teaming?
We have a number of articles already describing our approach to red teaming, but we also want to explain why we do it in the first place. Contrary to the belief we sometimes see, red teaming will not and should not provide a full insight into the security posture of a company. In essence, evaluating how secure an organization is comes down to answering three broad questions:
– How hardened is the infrastructure?
– What are the detection and monitoring capabilities?
– What are the processes to utilize those capabilities and react to incidents, and how well do they work?
Standard external black-box red teaming focuses on answering the last one, and this is where its value lies. In our opinion, it is impossible to know how a security team will react to an incident without causing one, and even the most advanced security solutions and custom detection rules cannot replace real people operating them and calling the shots. However, the test only briefly touches the first two, and only in the capacity sufficient to achieve the engagement objective. For example, it is impossible to list all undetected lateral movement methods, since we usually only need to use one or two, and it’s left unknown if there are any more vulnerabilities than in the report, since the team did not have to find them all. Another interesting issue is with vulnerabilities that are way too noisy to even try exploiting during an engagement. While it may be too loud for us, it might not be for an attacker, especially the “smash-and-grab” type.